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Abstract 
Given the historical volatility of the South African Rand (ZAR), it is important for investors to consider the 
impact exchange rate movements have on stock valuations and portfolios' returns. This research paper sets 
out to determine whether domestic investors, constrained by capital controls, can minimise the adverse 
effects of a volatile ZAR by constructing stock portfolios based on three classifications. Stocks are defined 
as either hedge, leverage or play, according to the currency denomination of revenues earned and costs 
incurred by the company. Beta coefficients are estimated for the three groups and expected returns are 
calculated for the different investors, which are predetermined by their future exchange rate expectations 
vis-a.-vis purchasing power parity (PPP). Portfolios differ by the weights assigned to the three stock groups 
within each portfolio and the weights of these constituents are obtained by Markowitz portfolio analysis. If 
the constructed portfolios' returns are greater than the benchmark's return once back-tested, a superior 
investment strategy is established. The portfolios' realised returns outperform the benchmark with varying 
degrees of success and imply the relative success with which an investor can protect his investment and 











The South African Rand (ZAR) has been exceptionally volatile since the end of the 1970s, 
both in real and nominal terms. Political turmoil has undeniably affected the South African 
economy through exchange rate movements, which have had a resounding influence on the 
value of shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Given its dependency on 
resource production and its openness to international trade, South Africa is especially 
susceptible to exchange rate volatility. Political instability, as well as external shocks, have 
caused capital flight in the past and left the value of the ZAR weak, as shown by a capital 
account deficit. Although ZAR weakness adversely affects South African consumers by 
reducing their purchasing power, it is able to provide benefits for the economy and its asset 
market. Export producers earn additional profits when South Africa's international 
competitiveness increases due to a depreciated ZAR value; these events are subsequently 
reflected in the value of stocks traded on the JSE. 
The JSE All Share index (ALSI), which is a market value weighted index of all stocks traded 
on the JSE, tends to react favourably to ZAR weakness whilst a strong ZAR causes it to 
deteriorate in value (Barr & Kantor, 2005). With more than half of its market capitalisation 
comprised of resource stocks and exports being predominantly resource based, South Africa 
plays an important role in global commodity markets along with other resource rich countries 
such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India and Russia. Consequently, the 
price of resources heavily influence company earnings, as well as the share market valuations 
on the JSE. The value of the ZAR and in particular the ZARJUSD exchange rate, therefore 
have a large impact on the performance of the JSE's different sectors (Kantor & Heese, 
2002). 
JSE investors are also affected by exchange rate movements, since these movements will 
ultimately affect the rate of return of their portfolios, through dividend and share price 
changes. The extent to which investors are affected will be largely determined by the 
constituents of the portfolio they hold, the sensitivity of individual shares to exchange rate 
changes and the approach taken when constructing their portfolio. Therefore, it is important 
to consider how ZAR value changes affect the rate of return of investors' portfolios, as well 











Most studies regarding JSE stock valuations have focused on the different sectors of the JSE 
(Resources, Industrials, Financials, Retail and Technology) and how macro economic 
changes, including exchange rate changes, impact the stocks in these sectors. This paper 
presents a relatively new method with which to classify JSE stocks, following the work of 
Barr & Kantor (2005). In their approach companies are defined as either rand hedge, rand 
leverage or rand play stocks, according to the currency denomination of revenue earned and 
costs incurred by the company. This stock classification allows one to better analyse the 
direct impact exchange rate movements may have on share prices. 
Rand plays are defined as stocks listed on the JSE by companies with ZAR costs and ZAR 
revenues, whilst companies that incur ZAR denominated costs but earn foreign revenue (i.e. 
USD) are classified as rand leverage stocks. The third category of stocks considered are rand 
hedge stocks, which are companies with costs and revenues predominantly in foreign 
currency. Companies classified in the same group, which have similar currency denominated 
cost and earnings structures, should exhibit the same trend in share price when the value of 
the ZAR appreciates or depreciates. For example, when the value of the ZAR falls both rand 
leverage and rand hedge stocks tend to perform well since company revenue is earned in 
foreign currency, which is worth relatively more when converted into ZAR. Depreciation of 
the ZAR yields greater company profits and provides a higher rate of return to the investor, 
when investing in these two stock categories. In comparison, rand play companies with 
revenues and costs denominated in ZAR, realise inferior returns relative to the other two 
groups, given the same currency depreciation. Barr and Kantor's (2005) classification is 
therefore especially useful when examining the effect exchange rate fluctuations have on 
share prices. 
The focus of this paper will be to extend the work done by Barr and Kantor in their 2005 
paper by constructing stock portfolios based on their company classification. Portfolio 
construction will assume investors are risk-averse and obey a mean-variance criterion, a 
theory first introduced by Harry Markowitz in 1952. Expected returns are calculated for the 
hedge, leverage and play groups, which are dependent on the beta estimates of the three 
groups, as well as the investor's assumption of the future value of the ZAR. Once the three 
groups' expected returns are calculated, Markowitz portfolio analysis is used to obtain 











ascertain whether USIng this type of classification provides the investor with a superior 
method with which to construct portfolios. If the constructed portfolios provide higher 
returns than those of a comparable benchmark when back-tested, this strategy could be used 
as a successful hedging tool that enables an investor to maximise portfolio returns by 
minimising the adverse effects of a volatile exchange rate. 
Ultimately what this research paper sets out to do is determine whether a South African 
investor, who is constrained by capital controls, can actively seek to minimise the adverse 
effects of a depreciating ZAR (which decreases his wealth) by constructing portfolios 
according to Barr and Kantor's (2005) company classification, and which are dependent on 
the investor's future exchange rate expectations. If the returns of said portfolios can 
outperform the benchmark once back-tested, then the empirical evidence will support the 
hypothesis that a superior strategy with which to leverage against exchange rate fluctuations 
has been established. 
Overview: 
Section 1.1 provides the reader with a historical revIew of the South African ZAR and 
addresses the reasons behind its volatile nature. In section 1.2, the cause of exchange rate 
changes, as well as the effect of these changes is considered. Section 1.3 of the paper 
examines the relationship between the ZAR and the value of the JSE, and its importance for 
investors. 
Section 2.1 looks at the methodology used by Barr and Kantor (2005) to classify the top 40 
companies of the JSE All Share 40 index (ALSI40). Section 2.2 goes on to provide a 
summary of Barr and Kantor's results and replicates their sensitivity analysis ofthe 40 largest 
companies on the JSE to changes in the value of the ZAR. The results obtained are compared 
to those of Barr and Kantor (2005) to test for conformity and reasons for disparities are 
examined. 
Section 3 extends the work of Barr and Kantor (2005) by estimating the exchange rate and 
market betas of the three stock classifications. The period under review is from July 1998 to 
the end of June 2004. To estimate the beta coefficients of the hedge, leverage and play 











Group returns are computed by assigning market capitalisation weights to each stock 
constituent within the three categories. 
Section 4 estimates the expected returns of the hedge, leverage and play groups by applying 
the exchange rate and market beta estimates from the previous section. The three groups' 
expected returns are dependent on the exchange rate predictions of the different investors 
considered, as well as the market's return. PPP is explored as a means with which investors 
predict exchange rate movements for the year ahead. 
In section 5, Markowitz portfolio analysis uses the different investors' estimated returns of 
the three groups to determine each group's weight in the final portfolios constructed. These 
weights are subsequently back-tested and applied to the constituents' realised returns to 
ascertain how the investors' portfolios performed relative to the market. The results suggest 
an investor using Barr and Kantor's (2005) stock classification, as well as PPP to predict 
changes in the future value of the ZAR, is able to protect his investment against the 
undesirable effects of a volatile exchange rate. However, the relative success with which an 
investor can protect his investment and outperform the market ultimately depends on the 












1.1 A Historical review of the South African ZAR and grounds for its volatile nature 
Exchange controls have heavily regulated the value of the ZAR and have been present in 
South Africa since the 1960's, when the South African ZAR was pegged to either the Great 
Britain Pound (GBP) or the American dollar (USO). Capital controls can reduce exchange 
rate volatility (Farrell, 2001), and have insulated the ZAR from the destabilising effects of 
political, as well as economic shocks. For the period 1961 to 1971, the ZAR exchange rate 
was pegged to the GBP which helped maintain a stable inflation rate in South Africa. The 
absence of shocks and a stable inflation rate during this period meant that the ZAR did not 
diverge significantly from its purchasing power parity (PPP) value. This is shown by low 
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Source: Investec Asset Management2 and IMF (1960=100), monthly data. 
I South Africa's effective exchange rate is measured in terms of a weighted average exchange rate between 
South Africa and her 14 most important trading partners. 
2 There is no official data available prior to 1970. Andre Roux, from Investec, calculated an index going 
back to 1960 based on his estimates. Data for the period 1979:0 I to 2003 :06 is from the IMF monetary 











During the period 1971 and 1979, the ZAR was essentially fixed and pegged to the USD or 
the GBP. Notwithstanding, the real ZAR strengthen substantially when, led by the price of 
gold, commodity prices more than doubled in the early 1970s and again in the course of 
1979-1980 (Kantor, 2003). Yet the exchange rate inevitably depreciated in 1976 when the 
Soweto uprising increased scrutiny of South African's apartheid policy and reluctance to 
implement democratic reform. Heightened political uncertainty in South Africa caused large 
capital outflows that severely impacted upon the value of the ZAR (Barr & Kantor, 2002). As 
figure 2 and 3 demonstrate, the presence of shocks during the period 1970 to 1979 caused a 
significant degree of exchange rate volatility in the nominal and real value of the ZAR. 
Figure 2: 
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Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 
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Source: Investec Asset Management (1970= 1 00), monthly data. 
In 1979, following the recommendation of the De Kock Commission, South Africa's 
exchange rate policy was aimed towards a more market orientated ZAR value and lead to the 
introduction of a dual currency exchange rate system. With two exchange rates in place, the 
financial ZAR and the commercial ZAR, South Africa had effectively implemented a floating 
peg to the USD. This allowed greater exchange rate flexibility in South Africa without fully 
liberalising the capital account and allowing the ZAR to float freely. 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) set the financial ZAR exchange rate daily 
according to market forces and it was utilized solely for capital account transactions (Barr & 
Kahn, 1994). The financial ZAR represented the exchange rate for ZAR assets held by 
foreign investors, (Kantor & Heese, 2002). Its highly volatile nature was largely attributable 
to the perceived risk associated with the South African economy by foreigners, given the 
political circumstances at the time. Current account transactions were executed using the 
commercial ZAR, which was stronger than the financial ZAR. The fact that the financial 
ZAR traded at a discount afforded foreign JSE investors a higher return on their South 











damaging effects that volatile portfolio transactions (of non-residents) had on the capital 
account from other foreign transactions (Farrell, 2001). The use of the financial ZAR meant 
that capital flows from South African residents were under more austere controls than those 
of non-residents. 
The dual exchange rate system was abolished in February 1983 in an attempt to further 
liberalise the capital account. This allowed non-residents to move their proceeds freely across 
South African borders and as a result, capital flows directly influenced the ZAR's value. 
Political and external shocks took their toll on the exchange rate in August 1985, when the 
South African government failed to meet the democratic reform expectations of foreign 
investors [P.W. Botha's "Rubicon" speech]. Despite high interest rates, the South African 
ZAR depreciated substantially as disappointed foreign investors withdrew their capital on a 
large scale. Consequently, the exchange rate did not maintain its PPP value and caused the 
ZAR to be 35% undervalued (Barr & Kantor, 1999). PPP contends that expected inflation 
rate differentials between countries are the cause for changes in a currency's expected value. 
Given a surprisingly stable inflation rate of 15% throughout the 1980s (Barr & Kahn, 1994), 
implies that the unexpected ZAR depreciation for this period was solely the effect of 
unpredictable shocks. Figure 4 illustrates the collapse of the real and nominal exchange rates 
during the course of the decade. 
Capital flight, the falling gold price, and the debt standstill crisis of the mid 1980s, lead to the 
fall of the ZAR in the fist half of the decade and were catalysts to the reintroduction of the 
financial ZAR in August 1985 (Barr & Kahn, 1994). However, this did not prevent the ZAR 
from depreciating further in the last half of the 1980s, as the capital account had to be kept in 
surplus to enable South Africa to meet debt repayments. 
Uncertainty over the shift in political power exacerbated the exchange rate's volatility during 
the first half of the 1990s and was the source of depreciation, both in real and nominal terms. 
Only in the year following South Africa's first democratic elections held in May 1994 did the 
nominal ZAR's value improve, as the future prospects of the economy strengthened. The 
financial ZAR was permanently removed in 1995 and was the first step towards the gradual 











(Nattrass, 2002). Consequently, large-sized portfolio movements have been allowed to flow 
between South Africa and abroad (Kantor, 2003). 
Figure 4: 
Real & Nominal Effective Exchange Rates 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank (1995=100), monthly data. 
In 1998, monetary policy, which sought to defend the value of the ZAR and reduce inflation, 
was challenged by a volatile exchange rate. With the reserve bank informally targeting3 an 
annual inflation rate of 1-5%, a relatively stable exchange rate was required in order to meet 
inflation targets. However, the emerging market liquidity crisis - an external shock - during 
this period caused a significant fall in the value of the ZAR in 1998 (Kantor, 2003). Although 
in 1999 the ZAR managed to regain some of the 20% real value it had lost in the previous 
year, it followed a consistent downward trend throughout 2000 and 2001. The ZAR weakness 
led to much speculation about its future value and caused panic amongst locals in 200 I. The 
rush to obtain USD currency only served to depreciate the ZAR further and increase the rate 
of inflation. The ZAR depreciation continued over a 3-month period, losing 40% of its value 
despite attempts by the reserve bank to defend the currency with repeated interest rate hikes. 
3 Inflation targeting was formally introduced in South Africa on the 23 February 2000, when T.T. Mboweni 











Since inflation differentials between South Africa and her trading partners have by and large 
been lower than 5% since 1996 (Barr & Kantor, 2005), it remains difficult to attribute the 
sizeable depreciation in 2000 and 2001 to economic fundamentals. General public concern at 
the time lead to the establishment of the Myburgh Commission of Inquiry, whose mandate 
was to investigate the cause of the 2001 depreciation of the ZAR. When the commission 
released their report in 2002, they concluded several key macroeconomic factors could have 
been at fault. Amongst the most notable were: global economic slowdown, contagion effects 
from Argentina, as well as deterioration of the current account. Even though people 
speculated that large currency bets had been taken against the ZAR, the Commission of 
Inquiry did not find such speculation to be true, nor that capital controls had been violated 
(Bhundia & Gottschalk, 2003). 
However, given that most of these macroeconomic conditions had been present in 2001, the 
Commission was not able to explain the acceleration in depreciation during the last months of 
the year. An IMF working paper confirms that domestic, as well as global macroeconomic 
factors are "unlikely to be significant explanations for the sharp depreciation at year-end 
2001" (Bhundia & Gottschalk, p.l 0, 2003). Therefore, the depreciation of the ZAR in 1998 
and 2001 can only be attributed to shocks (i.e. nominal disturbances) the South African 
economy experienced during those years. The fall of the ZAR during these two periods is 
shown in figure 5. The real ZAR weakness during this period, however, gave exporters a 
competitive advantage that increased profits and helped South Africa escape a recession 
which was felt by most of the world (Kantor, 2003). The ZAR outperformed even the most 
optimistic of estimates towards the end of 2003 and 2004 when it regained lost value and 
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Section 1.2 The origin of exchange rate movements and their effects on the economy 
As the previous section shows, the dominant force behind South Africa's variable exchange 
rate has been the existence of shocks, both political and macroeconomic, that the economy 
has endured. Whether or not these shocks have had a real effect on the state of the economy 
has been largely dependent on whether the nominal exchange rate, subsequent to the shock, 
deviated significantly from its PPP value. The real exchange rate would then diverge from its 
long run steady equilibrium path and render the currency under or over valued, depending on 
the direction of the change4 . The economy's international competitiveness would be affected 
by a change in the real value of the ZAR and may have an effect on prices, which causes the 
exchange rate to revert back to its original PPP value. When shocks are the fundamental basis 
for changes in the exchange rate, nominal and real exchange rates display similar movement 
patterns (Barr & Kantor, 2005), as is shown by figure 6. 
Figure 6: 
Real & Nominal Effective Exchange Rates 
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Source: IMF International monetary statistics (1995=100), monthly data extracted from 
DataStream. 
4 The nominal exchange rate is undervalued if the currency depreciates above its PPP value (i.e. more than 












Nominal shocks are usually the reflection of monetary policy and tend to affect exchange 
rates less than real shocks, by causing prices to change in a more general manner rather than 
explicitly affecting the exchange rate. On the other hand, political instability or productivity 
changes (i.e. real shocks) are more likely to cause the real ZAR to deviate from PPP. When 
exchange rate movements can be attributed purely to monetary causes, the exchange rate will 
remain close to PPP, (Barr & Kantor, 2005). When exchange rates follow inflation 
differentials between countries and PPP holds, the real exchange rate remains constant (Barr 
& Kahn, 1994) and the economy does not sustain any real effects, since the competitiveness 
and profitability of the country is unaltered. Firms involved in international trade do not incur 
losses or gains, since what is lost from exchange rate swings is remunerated through price 
differentials and vice versa. 
When PPP does not hold, however, the real profitability of foreign trade is affected and can 
have real repercussions for the economy (Kantor & Marchetti, 2003). If for example, the real 
exchange rate were to depreciate following a shock to the capital account, as occurred in 
1998 and 2001, exports internationally become more competitive. The price of goods and 
services rises in response to increased foreign demand, which causes the price of domestic 
goods not traded internationally to also rise. The direct effect an exchange rate shock has on 
tradable goods and indirectly on non-tradable goods restores exchange rates back to their 
long run PPP value (Barr & Kantor, 2005). 
If the real exchange rate were to appreciate, the opposite would occur. Exports become 
relatively more expensive and less competitive abroad, which causes foreign demand to fall. 
The price of exported goods falls due to lower foreign demand and over time leads to a fall in 
the price of domestic goods not traded internationally. Competitive forces would put 
downward pressure on prices, which would eventually fall, thereby re-establishing PPP 
equilibrium. Therefore the further away the real exchange rate deviates from its long run PPP 
value, the stronger is the expectation that with time, through price changes, the real exchange 











1.3 Investors, Exchange rates and the value of JSE stocks 
Individuals purchase shares as a form of investment, which enables them to finance future 
consumption and accumulate wealth, (Kantor & Heese, 2002). Therefore, any variable that 
affects the price or earnings of stocks is particularly important to the investor, as it may 
adjust the expected return of shares, as well as the net worth of their assets. Given the past 
volatility of the ZAR, exchange rate movements are a major source of risk that affect stock 
valuations and which investors should account for when forming expectations about the 
future performance of stocks traded on the JSE. 
A weaker nominal exchange rate places upward pressure on prices and produces, with a lag, 
a higher rate of inflation. For asset value to remain unchanged, share prices must rise in line 
with inflation so as to leave the real rate of return unchanged. However, ZAR weakness 
automatically reduces the value of current company earnings and dividends when 
denominated in a stronger currency and represents uncertainty for the foreign investor (Barr 
& Kantor, 1999). Even though the real rate of return will not be affected in the long term as 
inflationary forces drive up share prices, uncertainty may potentially cause investors to 
withdraw from the market. 
Figure 7: 
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Figure 7 illustrates the strong relationship between the value of the JSE All Share index 
expressed in ZAR and the nominal ZARJUSD exchange rate. The JSE performed remarkably 
well in 2002 and 2004 as shown in figure 8 below. During this period the index values of the 
JSE All Share index were close to what they had been in the late 1960's when the JSE 
realised all time highs around the 11500 mark that were led by the gold price. The good news 
for JSE investors is that these relatively high values represent high values for the JSE All 
Share index in real terms (Kantor & Heese, 2002). 
Figure 8: 
The JSE All Share Index 
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Source: McGregor Database. 
However, the historical performance of the JSE when expressed in USD terms has been poor. 
Although the JSE All Share index in USD has maintained a fairly constant value compared to 
its ZAR equivalent (figure 9), in 2003 its USD value was close to that in 1990 and 
substantially less (approximately half) than what it was worth in 1995 (Kantor, 2003). From 
1980, the value of the JSE in USD has increased by approximately 20% which, given a 20% 
fall in the real exchange rate during this period, implies that the JSE has hardly experienced 
any real growth since growth rates have merely mirrored the rate of domestic inflation (Barr 
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Company earnings and dividend flows are the principal components that determine the value 
of the JSE All Share index in USD terms. For the period under review, the poor performance 
of the JSE in USD has to a large extent been the result of low real earnings growth, which 
can be attributed to the low price of commodities on world markets. Resource company 
earnings constitute approximately half of the JSE's earnings, and as such have a powerful 
influence on the value and growth rate of the JSE All Share index (Kantor, 2003). 
Exchange rate changes have directly influenced the ZAR value of JSE stocks since South 
Africa's currency crisis caused the ZAR to depreciate significantly in 2001. ZAR weakness 
has had a positive effect on the value of the JSE All Share index, whereas a strong exchange 
rate has negatively affected its value (Barr & Kantor, 2002). The explicit relationship 
observed between the ZAR and the JSE All Share index (figure 7) is due to the large 
presence of resource companies listed on the JSE. Resource companies tend to perform 
exceptionally well in times of ZAR weakness, thereby leading the general direction of the 
JSE. However, other sectors, such as financial and retail, may not experience the same 











profitability of their operations is a direct result of their cost and revenue structures (Barr & 












2.1 The Leverage effect of Stocks on the JSE 
The market value of shares listed on the JSE is a representative measure of companies' 
expected future dividends and earnings, discounted to their present value. The effect 
exchange rate movements have on company earnings, therefore, directly impacts their current 
market price. Following Barr and Kantor (2005), three categories can be used to classify 
companies listed on the JSE according to their revenue and cost structures; these are rand 
plays, rand leverage and rand hedge companies and are discussed in more detail below. 
2.1.1 Rand plays 
Rand plays are South African based companies that generate most of their revenue in ZAR 
and incur ZAR costs. As will be seen, this category is comprised mainly of retail and 
financial companies. 
The ZAR proceeds or dividends of investing in rand plays are directly proportional to the 
profitability ofthe companies' operations at the time, which can be defined as: 
Div(ZAR)t a Rev(ZAR)t - Cost(ZAR)t 
Rand play companies provide no leverage to investors when the exchange rate fluctuates. 
Since most of their business depends on the purchasing power of domestic consumers, rand 
plays tend to perform poorly with exchange rate weakness and favourably when the ZAR is 
strong. 
2.1.2 Rand leverage 
Companies that are part of the rand leverage category have costs denominated in ZAR but 
most, if not all, revenue is earned in foreign currency. These are typically characteristics of 











are directly influenced by two factors; the ZARIUSD exchange rate and the USD price of 
resources. Dividends are proportional to profits once converted into ZAR5 : 
Div(ZAR)t a [Rev(USD)l - Cost(ZAR)t *(USD/ZAR)]* (ZARlUSD)6 
Rand leverage companies provide investors with protection against ZAR weakness, assuming 
USD commodity prices remain constant. A depreciated ZAR implicitly increases the ZAR 
value of these companies' USD revenues and simultaneously reduces costs incurred in ZAR, 
due to the USD's increased purchasing power. However, the beneficial leverage effect of 
ZAR weakness is only short lived since once prices rise, the real ZAR reverts back to its long 
run equilibrium value. The inflationary effect of ZAR weakness eliminates the leverage 
effect in the near future, implying investors are only able to take advantage of the leverage 
effect these companies provide for a short period of time whilst prices remain sticky. In other 
words, USD earnings are only effectively higher for as long as the real ZAR deviates from its 
PPP value. 
2.1.3 Rand hedges 
With predominantly all operations based abroad, rand hedge companies have both revenue 
and cost denominated in foreign currency. Once profits are converted into ZAR, dividends 
are directly proportional to the profits rand hedge companies generate overseas. It follows 
that: 
Div(ZAR)t a [Rev(USD)t - Cost(USD)t]* (ZARIUSD) 
These companies are also able to provide exchange rate leverage for investors when the ZAR 
is weak, as the ZARIUSD exchange rate affects the ZAR profits these companies earn 
directly, while their profits are not dependent on the welfare of the South African economy. 
As such, the weaker the ZAR is to the USD, the more ZAR profits are generated once foreign 
currency earnings are converted into ZAR and vice versa. 
5 Assume all foreign currency is earned in USD. 
6 ZAR costs must first be converted into USD (or to the relevant foreign currency), and then USD 











2.2 Are the results consistent with the theory? 
Barr and Kantor (2005) used weekly data from I-Net Bridge to test the sensitivity of the 
JSE's 40 largese listed companies to exchange rate fluctuations during the volatile period of 
2001 to 2003. The model used was as follows: 
%ALSl j = a + PI %(ZARIUSO) + P2 %ALSI4o 
where8:%ALSI j is the continuously compounded percentage change of the i-th component of 
the ALSI40; 
%(ZARIUSO) is the continuously compounded percentage change of the ZARIUSO 
exchange rate; 
%ALSI4o is the continuously compounded percentage change of the ALSI40. 
The independent variables %(ZARIUSO) and %ALSI4o represent the exchange rate and 
market effects respectively and their beta values determine the degree of sensitivity each 
stock has with respect to exchange rate and market movements. Although changes in the 
value of the ZAR will indirectly affect the market's general movement, the authors contend 
that since the correlation between the independent variables (when presented in percentage 
change form) is low (0.23) the problem of multicollinearity can be ignored. 
Two betas were calculated for each of the 40 listed shares from January 2001 to August 
2003. The exchange rate beta, PI, measures how responsive share prices are to exchange rate 
changes, whereas P2 measures the sensitivity of individual companies to market wide 
movements9 . The larger the value of PI, the greater the change in share price given an 
exchange rate change. If PI is positive, the exchange rate and share price will move in the 
same direction. However, if PI is negative, the exchange rate and share price will move in 
opposite directions. Therefore, a positive PI implies a weak ZAR will cause the share price to 
increase and to decrease in value if PI is negative. A priori, one should expect rand plays to 
have negative betas, whereas positive betas should characterise rand leverage and rand hedge 
7 The 40 companies are the constituents of the ALSI40, which is a market value weighted index of the 
largest market capitalisation companies listed on the JSE. 
8 Definitions are those given by Barr & Kantor in their 2005 paper. 
9 For classification purposes PI is of greater importance that P2, however both variables are important in 











stocks. Before estimating the PI value of the constituents of the ALSI40, Barr and Kantor 
(2005) grouped the shares into their respective categories, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: 
RAND PLAY RAND LEVERAGE RAND HEDGE 
1 ABSA 1 Anglo American 1 Liberty International 
2 Amalgmated Beverages 2 Anglo Gold 2 Old Mutual 
3 Barloworld 3 Anglo Platinum 3 Richemont 
4 Bidvest 4 Avgold 4 SABMiller 
5 Firstrand 5 BHP Billiton 
6 Imperial 6 Gold Fields 
7 Investec Ltd 7 Harmony 
8 Investec Pic 8 Impala 
9 Liberty Group 9 Iscor 
10 MTN 10 Kumba 
II Nampak II Remgro 
12 Naspers 12 Sappi 
13 Nedcor 13 Sasol 
14 Network Healthcare 14 Steinhoff 
15 Pick 'n Pay 
16 RMB 
17 Sanlam 
18 Standard Bank 
19 Telkom 
20 Tiger Brands 
21 Venfin 
22 Woolworths 
Description of Sectors and Classifications 
The rand play category consists of 22 stocks predominantly from the financial and retail 
sectors. Although some of the companies in this group generate revenue abroad, their main 
business lies within South African borders and can be broadly defined as rand plays (PLAY). 
One should therefore expect these companies to have negative PI values, unless the fraction 
of earnings generated abroad have a larger than anticipated leverage effect on company 
profits. 
Not surprisingly all of the 14 rand leverage (LEV) stocks (save for Steinhoff) are resource 











revenues. These stocks should all have positive ~I coefficients and provide the investor with 
short term leverage against currency depreciation. 
Whilst only 4 stocks represent the rand hedge (HEDGE) classification, Richemont and 
Liberty International are the only pure HEDGE stocks with all of their operations conducted 
abroad. Even though the profitability of SAB Miller and Old Mutual still remain largely 
dependent on the South African economy, they have a significant portion of their operations 
conducted abroad, which is consistent with their HEDGE classification. A positive ~I is also 
expected for the stocks in this group. 
Barr and Kantor (2005) found their empirical estimates did reflect their a priori categories, 
even though the statistical significance of each share varied considerably across the 40 
stocks. The authors argue that given the objective was to categorise the different shares into 
groups, their relative significance should not detract from the analysis. It is evident then that 
"the calculated beta coefficients for the exchange rate variable (~I) serve as a strong 
empirical support for categorising the status of the ALSI 40 as either rand leverage stocks, 
rand hedges or rand plays", (Barr & Kantor, 2005: p.90). Their results are shown in table A 
in the appendix. 
Barr and Kantor found that the LEV category, which comprised predominantly resource 
companies, had positive estimated exchange rate betas as expected, save for Gold Fields. All 
of the PLAY stocks had negative estimated exchange rate betas, which was noted by the 
authors as surprising given that some PLAY companies have a substantial share of their 
operations conducted abroad. Except for Old Mutual, which had a negative beta, positive 
exchange rate betas were estimated for the HEDGE group. Barr and Kantor suggest that the 
mixture of operating assets both locally and abroad is the primary rationale why Gold Fields 
and Old Mutual do not have positive beta estimates. Notwithstanding, Barr and Kantor's 
classification is most valuable when determining the effects exchange rate movements have 
on share prices and is firmly supported by their empirical results. 
In order to replicate Barr and Kantor's classification model, 40 monthly data series were 
extracted from DataStream for the period January 2001 to August 2003. The most notable 











ALSI40. In its place was Discovery Holdings (the insurance company), which is omitted 
from the analysis for consistency purposes. While the period under review is the same, the 
source and frequency of the data differs from that used by Barr and Kantor. A low correlation 
between the two independent variables of 0.12 was observed for the given period and thus 
multicollinearIity can also be ignored for the purposes of this analysis. Data differences 
should cause the results to vary, although not significantly. The results obtained are 
summarised in table B of the appendix. 
The findings are largely consistent with those presented by Barr and Kantor in their 2005 
paper. All of the stocks in the HEDGE group had positive estimated ~l coefficients, including 
Old Mutual. The 13 stocks in the LEV group, including Gold Fields, also had positive 
estimated ~l coefficients. The reason for Old Mutual and Gold Fields stocks generating 
positive, as opposed to negative, estimated ~l values may be attributable to the use of 
monthly data, thereby making the results more robust to market volatility during this period. 
Most of the divergence between the results of this paper and those of Barr and Kantor (2005) 
were found within the PLAYgroup. In their study all 22 PLAY stocks had negative 
estimated ~l values, which even Barr and Kantor found surprising given the mixture of local 
and foreign operations of some of the companies in the group. Table B (see appendix) shows 
only 12 of the 22 stocks in the PLA Y group had negative estimated ~l values. The 10 PLAY 
stocks 10 with positive ~l values are not consistent with the PLAYgroup classification, but 
concur with the observation noted by Barr and Kantor above. Perhaps it is fair to say that the 
portion of earnings generated abroad do provide investors with greater than expected 
leverage against local currency depreciation. If operations abroad were to expand in the 
future, one could potentially consider revising the classification of these 10 stocks and 
reclassify them under the LEV group. 
Although differences were found between the two studies and the statistical significance of 
both beta estimates vary widely across companies, it does not detract from the overall 
classification put forward by Barr and Kantor. The results of both papers provide strong 
empirical evidence that LEV and HEDGE stocks, with positive estimated exchange rate beta 
10 The stocks in the PLAYgroup with positive beta coefficients are Saniam, Standard Bank, Liberty Group, 











coefficients (~1)' should provide investors leverage in times of currency depreciation given 
their cost and revenue structures. Whereas PLAY stocks, with predominantly local operations 














The remainder of the paper focuses explicitly on verifying whether the segmentation of the 
ALSI40 constituents into three groups yields a superior portfolio contextualisation for the 
average investor. If the rate of return of the final portfolios constructed is found to be greater 
than that of a comparable indexl!, the classification will prove to be extremely valuable to the 
investor, especially when faced with a depreciating ZAR. Effectively, this would imply that 
by actively constructing portfolios in accordance with the group classifications presented, 
investors are better able to protect their investment's asset value than by adopting a passive 
strategy and investing in the domestic market index. 
The methodology section extends the work of Barr and Kantor (2005) by estimating the 
exchange rate and market beta coefficients for the three group classifications. In order to 
estimate the beta values, the rate of return of the three groups are first calculated by assigning 
market capitalisation weights to each stock constituent within a group. Once the return for 
each group has been computed, beta coefficients are estimated and the expected returns for 
the HEDGE, LEV and PLAY groups are calculated. The difference between the final 
portfolios' returns is the weights assigned to three constituent groups. 
The expected returns of the portfolio constituents, at the HEDGE, LEV and PLAY level, are 
dependent on the investor' s 12 a priori expectations of future exchange rate movements vis- a-
vis PPP. Markowitz portfolio analysis allows one to compute constituent weights, which are 
back-tested to determine whether the performance of the final portfolios can consistently 
outperform the market, in our case the ALSI. 
II The ALSI is used, as opposed to the ALSI40, as it is a better representation of the general state of the 
South African economy. 











3.1 Calculating Realised Returns and Beta coefficients for the three groups 
The period under review is from July 1998 to the end of June 2004 and the time series used 
were extracted from DataStream. To calculate the returns of the three groups in the study, 
one needs to first calculate the returns of the JSE ALSI40 constituents. The monthly Total 
Return Index 13 (TRI) is used for each stock to calculate its monthly growth rate, which is 
effectively the stock's rate of return. Each stock's monthly return is calculated for a three 
year period that is used to calculate the respective groups' rate of return over the period. 
Since the period considered is July 1998 to the end of June 2004, a total of four 3-year rolling 
windows are employed. The monthly returns for the three groups are calculated by assigning 
weights to each stock based on the market capitalisation value of the stock within the 
HEDGE, LEV and PLAY groups. Using the same methodology as in section 2, exchange rate 
and market beta coefficients are estimated for the three groups over the four 3-year window 
periods. 
3.1.1 First 3-year window; period 1998:07 - 2001 :06 
During the first period the HEDGE group consists of only two stocks, Richemont and SAB 
Miller. Liberty International and Old Mutual are excluded from the calculation as they listed 
after July 1998 and there is not three full years worth of monthly TRI data. If one were to 
compute the rate of return of the HEDGE group using less than 3-years of monthly data for 
Old Mutual and Liberty International, the results would be biased. 
Once the returns for Richemont and SAB Miller have been estimated, weights are assigned to 
the two stocks to calculate the rate of return for the HEDGE group over the period. Each 
stock's weight in a group is proportional to its market capitalisation (at the end of the 3-year 
window period) relative to the total market capitalisation of the stocks in that group during 
the period under consideration. For example, the weight of Richemont is calculated as the 
market capitalisation of Richemont (as at 2001:06) divided by the sum of the market 
capitalisation of Richemont and SAB Miller, as they are the only two stocks in the HEDGE 
group during the period. Following this method provides one with weights of 0.70 and 0.30 
13 A Total Return Index series assumes dividends paid out during the year are reinvested by the investor. 











for Richemont and SAB Miller respectively. Thus, the monthly returns for the HEDGE group 
are the sum of each stock's return multiplied by its respective weight. 
Beta coefficients for each group are estimated usmg a similar model as in section 2. 
However, PI and P2 now represent the degree of sensitivity of a group, and not of a stock, 
with respect to exchange rate and market wide movements. The model used is shown below: 
The problem of multicollinearity can be ignored smce the correlation between the 
independent variables during the period is low (-0.02). An exchange rate beta (PI) of -0.46 
and a market beta (P2) of 0.16 were estimated for the HEDGE group over the first 3-year 
window period. A negative beta coefficient is surprising given both Richemont and SAB 
Miller had positive exchange rate beta (PI) estimates during the 3-year period, and could be 
attributable to the negative correlation between the independent variable. 
The leverage group consists of 13 stocks 15, however, in the first window period only 10 
stocks are included in the calculation. Kumba Resources, Remgro and Steinhoff are excluded 
as these companies only listed after 1998:06. To derive the rate of return for the LEV group 
the same methodology is used as with the HEDGE group. First, the returns of the 10 stocks 
are calculated, and then weights are assigned to the stocks according to the market 
capitalisation of each stock relative to the group's total market capitalisation. For the LEV 
group beta coefficients of 0.16 and 0.43 were estimated for PI and P2 respectively. 
Positive PI estimates for the LEV group are consistent with the theory covered in section 2. 
Given the depreciation of the ZAR during this period, the LEV group should theoretically 
yield the best protection against ZAR depreciation, achieve the largest return and outperform 
the other groups. 
14 Where GROUP; refers to either the HEDGE, LEV or PLAY constituent under consideration. 
15 It was noted in section 2 that at the time the study was conducted the stock Avgold was not a constituent 
of the ALSI40, and in its place was the stock Discovery. For the remainder of the paper, Discovery is 
omitted entirely from the analysis for consistency purposes. Consequently there are only 13, as opposed to 











A priori, one expects a negative PI coefficient for the PLAYgroup, which should yield the 
weakest performance of all three groups in times of ZAR weakness. The PLAYgroup, is the 
largest group and consists of 22 stocks. Three stocks (Investec, Sanlam and Telkom) are 
excluded in the first window period, given they are not listed as at 1998:07. Applying the 
same methodology as previously, the PLAYgroup's beta coefficients were calculated and PI 
and P2 values were estimated of -1.60 and 0.41 respectively. 
The estimated beta coefficients for the HEDGE, LEV and PLAY groups are used in section 4 
to calculate the investor's expected returns for the year following the 3-year window period 
(2001:07 to 2002:06), and these returns are subsequently used to construct the final 
portfolios. Whilst the statistical significance of beta estimates for the three groups was 
notably varied across the different time periods, the results should not be disregarded on this 
basis given the aim is to estimate the relative sensitivity of each group to exchange rate and 
market movements. 
3.1.2 Second 3-year window; period 1999:07 - 2002:06 
In the second window period, the HEDGE group consists of all four stocks, as three full years 
of monthly data are now available for Liberty International and Old Mutual 16 • By using 
market capitalisation weights as at the end of the period (2002:06) and applying the same 
method as in the previous section, PI and P2 coefficients of 0.30 and 0.44 respectively were 
estimated for the HEDGE group. Given the low correlation (0.19) of the independent 
variables during the second period, multicollinearity can be ignored. 
Steinhoff is included in the calculation of the LEV group for this period, as the company 
listed on the JSE in October 1998. With 11 stocks, the group yields estimated beta values of 
0.57 for PI and 0.29 for P2. The PLAYgroup has a total of 20 stocks since Sanlam 17 is now 
included and beta coefficients of -0.21 and 0.39 were estimated for PI and P2 respectively. 
3.1.3 Third 3-year window; period 2000:07 - 2003:06 
The HEDGE group yields beta estimates of 0.39 for PI and 0.52 for P2 and the problem of 
multicollinearity can once again be ignored since the correlation between the independent 
16 Liberty International and Old Mutual both listed on the JSE in July 1999. 











variables is low (0.16). Beta values for the LEV group are estimated as 0.71 for ~1 and 0.29 
for ~2 and the PLAYgroup yields a ~1 value of -0.03 and a ~2 value of 0.27 over the period. 
3.1.4 Fourth 3-year window; period 2001 :07 - 2004:06 
In the last window period, multicollinearity can also be ignored as the correlation of the 
independent variables is low at 0.05. The HEDGE group realised beta estimates of 0.06 and 
0.03 for ~I and ~2 respectively. For the LEV group (which for this period includes the stock 
Remgro l8) a ~1 value of 0.58 and ~2 value of 0.38 are estimated, whereas the PLAYgroup 
yields beta estimates of -0.20 and 0.32 for ~I and ~2 respectively. 
Except for the HEDGE groups' negative estimated ~I value in the first window period, the 
results concur with the a priori expectation of positive ~I coefficient estimates for the 
HEDGE and LEV groups and negative ~I estimates for the PLAYgroup. 
The beta coefficients estimated in the four 3-year window periods for the HEDGE, LEV and 
PLA Y groups are shown in table 2 below. The robustness of the results over the different 
periods considered, where the ZAR both depreciated and appreciated in value, provide 
further empirical evidence which support Barr and Kantor's (2005) stock classifications. 
These beta coefficients are applied in the following year to estimate the investor's expected 
returns for the three groups, whilst Markowitz portfolio analysis determines the weights 
assigned to each constituent group when constructing the final portfolios. 
Table 2: 
HEDGE LEV PLAY 
Time Period 
PI 132 PI 132 PI 132 
1998:07 to 2001:06 -0.46 0.16 0.16 0.43 -1.60 0.41 
1999:07 to 2002:06 0.30 0.44 0.57 0.29 -0.21 0.39 
2000:07 to 2003:06 0.39 0.52 0.71 0.29 -0.03 0.37 
2001:07 to 2004:06 0.06 0.03 0.58 0.38 -0.20 0.32 












Estimating expected returns 
The aim of this section IS to calculate the expected returns of the three company 
classifications by applying the estimated beta coefficients from the previous section. The four 
year investment period considered is from July 2001 to June 2005. The expected returns of 
the three groups are calculated over four I-year periods and are dependent on the investor's 
future exchange rate expectations, as well as the market's return. The same model as in 
section 3 is used to estimate the expected returns of the HEDGE, LEV and PLAY groups in 
each I-year period: 
%GROUP j = a + PI %(ZARIUSD) + P2 %ALSI4o 
Given one cannot predict what the broad market and the exchange rate will do in the future, 
one approach is to assume perfect foresight into the market's future movements (i.e. use 
actual realised market returns) and focus on the expected change of the ZAR's value in 
relation to its deviation from PPP. The beta coefficients estimated over the 3-year window 
period are applied in the subsequent year, with the market's realised rate of return and the 
investor's assumption of the exchange rate's movement for the year ahead. Looking forward 
I-year, a set of expected returns for the three constituent groups of the final portfolios are 
estimated, which are dependent on the investor's exchange rate forecasts. Thus, if the 
investor's exchange rate predictions are well founded, constructing portfolios based on Barr 
and Kantor's (2005) stock classification should enable the investor to outperform the market. 
4.1 The na"ive investor 
What if an investor does not have any definitive expectations of the future value of the ZAR? 
Or similarly, what would be the best approach if one thought the exchange rate was at its PPP 
value and not going to significantly change in value in the foreseeable future? In this event, 
the expected return of each group would only be dependent on the sensitivity of the group to 











Assuming the investor's profile did not change and he remained a nai"ve investor over the 
four year period, the expected returns of the HEDGE, LEV and PLAY groups would be 




Expected returns (%) 
HEDGE LEV PLAY 
2001:07 to 2002:06 5.57 12.86 12.12 
2002:07 to 2003:06 -2.72 -1.80 -2.45 
2003:07 to 2004:06 9.43 5.13 4.82 
2004:07 to 2005:06 l.33 15.67 13.34 
4.2 The informed and the conservative investors 
An investor with a better understanding of the macro economy could adopt a more astute 
approach when estimating the expected returns of the different groups of stocks. At the end 
of each 3-year window period, when forming exchange rate predictions for the following 
year, the informed investor could take a position on the ZAR dependent on the ZAR's current 
valuation vis-a-vis its PPP value. The ratio of the PPP exchange rate and the nominal 
ZARJUSD exchange rate is the real value of the ZAR (Kantor and Marchetti, 2003). Thus, 
using 1990 as the base 19 year, if the investor was able to recognise the rand was undervalued 
i.e. the current ZARJUSD exchange rate is larger than PPP would content, the expectation 
would be for the value of the ZAR to appreciate in the long term and restore the nominal 
exchange rate back to its PPP value. Similarly, if the ZAR was overvalued, the expectation 
would be for the ZAR to depreciate to its PPP value over time. Hence, PPP could be used to 
form superior exchange rate predictions, which would allow the investor to make a more 
informed prediction as to the future value of the ZAR, as well as the exchange rate's 
movement. 
19 The base year is ideally a year when the ZAR is fairly close to its PPP value, which implies a real ZAR 
value of one and therefore serves as a good base from which to infer PPP deviations. For the remainder of 











4.2.1 Period 1; 2001 :07 - 2002:06 
At the end of June 2001, with the current exchange rate trading at ZAR 8.05 to the USD and 
a PPP value of ZAR 5.08, the ZAR had become undervalued (5.08/8.05=0.63) relative to the 
base year. The informed investor therefore expects the ZAR to appreciate and forecasts a 
20% appreciation in the ZAR's value during the year. The investor does not expect the 
nominal exchange rate to be fully restored to its PPP value in the I-year period ahead; 
however, the extent by which the ZAR is over or undervalued enables the investor to better 
forecast the relative magnitude of the expected change of the exchange rate in the following 
year. The further away the exchange rate is from its PPP value, the stronger the expectation 
PPP will be restored through exchange rate movements. 
A more conservative investor may recognise the ZAR is undervalued and expect the 
exchange rate to appreciate over the long term. However, given the ZAR's recent 
depreciation, the conservative investor may not expect the exchange rate to appreciate in the 
short term and start to move towards its PPP value during the course of the following year. 
Instead, the conservative investor anticipates the ZAR will continue its downward trend and 
forecasts a further depreciation of 20%. 
During the period 2001 :07 to 2002:06, the ZAR did in fact depreciate significantly. However, 
one could have not predicted the external shock the South African economy endured in the 
last three months of 200 I. 
4.2.2 Period 2; 2002:07 - 2003:06 
Due to the sizable depreciation of the ZAR over the last year, the exchange rate would have 
deviated further from its PPP value. With a nominal ZAR value of 10.30 to the USD and a 
PPP exchange rate of 5.95 (5.95/1 0.30=0.58), the ZAR had become relatively more 
undervalued. Hence, given the significant undervaluation of the ZAR, at the beginning of the 
second period the informed investor could expect PPP to be restored through a strong 
appreciation in the ZAR and therefore forecasts a 30% appreciation for the year. 











investor could assume the exchange rate to depreciate further in the short term, albeit by a 
small amount20, and forecasts a 10% ZAR depreciation over the course of the year. 
4.2.3 Period 3; 2003:07 - 2004:06 
Even with the improvement in the ZAR's value during the period 2002:07 to 2003:06, at the 
start of the third period the ZAR remains undervalued on a PPP basis since the nominal 
exchange rate of ZAR 7.48 to the USD is larger that the PPP ZARJUSD exchange rate of 
5.92 (5.9217.48=0.79). Therefore, the informed investor expects the exchange rate to continue 
to regain lost value and PPP equilibrium to be restored through ZAR appreciation. Looking 
I-year ahead, the investor forecasts an optimistic 21 exchange rate appreciation of 20%. The 
more conservative investor also believes the ZAR will continue to appreciate but anticipates 
the exchange rate's movement towards PPP to be slower and forecasts a modest ZAR 
appreciation during the year of 10%. 
4.2.4 Period 4; 2004:07 - 2005:06 
Despite the ZAR's appreciation during the last two years, the informed investor infers the 
ZAR still to be undervalued relative to the base year, given a nominal and PPP value of ZAR 
6.15 and ZAR 5.77 to the USD respectively (5.77/6.15=0.94), and consequently expects an 
appreciation in the value of the ZAR. However, since the exchange rate is currently closer to 
its PPP value than in the previous periods, the investor anticipates a smaller ZAR 
appreciation and forecasts a 5% appreciation for the period. If more conservative, the 
investor could assume the exchange rate may once again deviate further from its PPP value 
and forecast a small depreciation in the exchange rate of 5% over the coming year. 
Appling the estimated beta coefficients from section 3 provides a set of expected returns for 
the three constituent groups that are a function of the investor's exchange rate assumptions 
vis-a-vis PPP, as well as the market's realised returns. The informed and the more 
conservative investors' expected returns for the four years are illustrated in tables 4 and 5 
respectively. 
20 Given the significant depreciation in the ZAR's exchange rate during the past two years, the investor 
assumes a smaller relative fall in the ZAR's value when looking I -year ahead. 
21 The investor forecasts an appreciation of equal magnitude as in the first period, despite the ZAR not 











Table 4: Informed investor 
Time Period 
Expected returns (%) 
HEDGE LEV PLAY 
2001:07 to 2002:06 14.76 9.72 44.09 
2002:07 to 2003:06 -11. 70 -18.91 3.95 
2003:07 to 2004:06 1.71 -9.14 5.36 
2004:07 to 2005:06 1.03 12.76 14.35 
Table 5: Conservative investor 
Time Period 
Expected returns (%) 
HEDGE LEV PLAY 
2001:07 to 2002:06 -3.62 16.01 -19.85 
2002 :07 to 2003 :06 0.27 3.90 -4.58 
2003:07 to 2004:06 5.57 -2.00 5.09 












Markowitz portfolio analysis and back-testing 
In this section, Markowitz portfolio analysis is used to obtain weights for the three 
constituent groups of the final portfolios for the na'ive, informed and conservative investor. 
These weights are back-tested and applied to the constituents' realised returns to ascertain 
how the investors' portfolios performed relative to the market over the four I-year periods. 
Using the theory and methodology presented to construct portfolios should afford the 
investor with two key advantages. Firstly, it should enable an investor to minimise their 
exposure to the adverse effects of a depreciating ZAR by using the three stock classification 
presented by Barr and Kantor (2005). Secondly, if exchange rate assumptions are well 
founded, it should allow the investor to consistently outperform the market. Back-testing the 
results will verify whether these observations are true. 
5.1 Markowitz portfolio analysis 
Markowitz frontiers are calculated for the na'ive, informed and conservative investor using 
the solver tool in excel. With solver one is able to estimate a mean-variance efficient frontier 
over a range of risk, using as inputs the expected returns of the three groups and the historical 
return volatility as a proxy for volatility (i.e. standard deviation), both of which were 
estimated and derived in previous sections. The Markowitz efficient frontier graphically 
represents the portfolios that maximise returns at each level of risk, by varying the weights of 
the portfolio's constituents. However, only one of the portfolios along the efficient frontier 
represents the best optimal portfolio for the investor. 
Once Markowitz frontiers are estimated for the four time periods, the risk free rate22 is 
introduced to the optimisation problem to obtain a tangency point with the efficient frontier, 
which depicts the optimal portfolio that maximises the reward-to-variability ratio for the 












investor. A direct measure of reward-to-risk is the Sharpe ratio, which is defined as a 
portfolio's excess returns to standard deviation. Therefore, the portfolio with the largest 
Sharpe ratio along the Markovitz efficient frontier also represents the optimal portfolio23 . 
From the return-standard deviation co-ordinates at the tangency point, constituent weights 
can be derived for the optimal portfolio. 
The estimated efficient frontier is dependent on the objective function of the optimisation 
problem and may be subject to constraints. The objective function can be to either minimise 
the variance or maximise the mean return. More specifically, one is able to set the variance or 
mean to equal a required value and solver will calculate the largest possible mean for a given 
variance or lowest variance for a given mean return. Constraints may also be placed on the 
optimisation problem. For example, if short sales (i.e. negative weights) are not desired, one 
can place a constraint on the constituents' weights to be greater than or equal to O. 
Two restrictions were placed on the optimisation problem; weights must be larger than or 
equal to zero i.e. no short-sales and the investor must be fully invested, therefore the sum of 
the constituents' weights is set equal to one. It is important to note a restricted efficient 
frontier is not able to achieve a mean return for the portfolio that is larger or smaller than the 
estimated returns (inputs) of the portfolio's constituents. To estimate the efficient (restricted) 
Markowitz frontier, the global minimum-variance portfoli024 i.e. the portfolio with the 
smallest attainable variance, was first calculated. Once the return for this portfolio had been 
estimated, the entire efficient frontier was generated by setting the mean equal to 
incrementally larger amounts and solving for the variance. 
The weights derived from the Markowitz portfolio analysis for the naive, informed and 
conservative investors are illustrated in tables 6, 7 and 8 respectively. 
23 The slope of the line from risk free rate that is tangent to the efficient frontier, also know as the Capital 
Allocation Line, is maximised and equal to the Sharpe ratio of the optimal portfolio, which denotes the 
P40rtfolio with th.e .highest re:vard-to-vari~bility ratio on the e~Ticient frontier.. . 
- The global mInImUm-Vanance portfolIo was calculated WIth the same two constramts of no short sellmg 













Naive HEDGE LEV PLAY 
2001:07 - 2002:06 0.32 0.68 0.00 
2002:07 - 2003:06 0.00 1.00 0.00 
2003:07 - 2004:06 1.00 0.00 0.00 
2004:07 - 2005:06 0.01 0.53 0.46 
Table 7: 
Weights 
Informed HEDGE LEV PLAY 
2001:07 - 2002:06 0.00 0.63 0.37 
2002:07 - 2003:06 0.00 0.00 1.00 
2003:07 - 2004:06 0.00 0.00 1.00 
2004:07 - 2005:06 0.00 0.22 0.78 
Table 8: 
Weights 
Conservative HEDGE LEV PLAY 
2001:07 - 2002:06 0.13 0.87 0.00 
2002:07 - 2003:06 0.00 1.00 0.00 
2003:07 - 2004:06 1.00 0.00 0.00 
2004:07 - 2005:06 0.11 0.85 0.04 
During the second and third time periods, the risk free rate was greater than the largest 
estimated return for the portfolios of the na'ive, informed and conservative investors. In this 
case, the optimal portfolio on the efficient frontier would be that which is able to achieve the 
largest return25 . Thus, a weight of one is assigned to the constituent with the largest estimated 
return and zero to the remaining constituents. 
25 Given the goal is to calculate a set of constituent weights for the three groups, the option of investing in 












To verify whether using the methodology presented affords the investor with a strategy with 
which to construct final portfolios that minimise the adverse effects of exchange rate 
movements, it is necessary to back-test the results. Given ex-post returns, beta estimates and 
PPP forecasted exchange rates can only be used to estimate, but not predict future returns, it 
is imperative to back-test the estimated constituents' weights to learn the true performance of 
the portfolios had these weights been applied. 
The realised returns of the HEDGE, LEV and PLAY constituents during the four I-year 
periods (from 2001 :07 to 2005:06) in conjunction with the estimated constituents' weights 
are used to derive the returns of the investors' portfolios. If the realised portfolio returns 
consistently outperform the market (i.e. the JSE ALSI benchmark), then a successful hedging 
strategy is established that can be used to protect the investor from the adverse effects of a 
fluctuating ZAR. The results are shown in table 9. 
Table 9: 
Realised returns (%) 
Period Naive Informed Conservative ALSI 
2001:07 - 2002:06 59.55 46.23 69.16 29.90 
2002:07 - 2003:06 -16.35 1.40 -16.35 -6.25 
2003:07 - 2004:06 34.19 26.19 34.19 18.15 
2004:07 - 2005:06 42.20 46.64 36.56 41.25 
Cumulative Return 119.59 120.46 123.56 83.05 
Only the informed investor is able to consistently outperform the market over the four years. 
Surprisingly, with the exception of the second period, the na'ive investor outperforms the 
market and is perhaps attributable to the fact that perfect market foresight is assumed in the 
study. However, the na'ive investor inevitably achieves the lowest return on a cumulative 
basis. Over the four year investment period, the conservative investor realises the second 












The relative performance of the informed and conservative investors' portfolios is linked to 
the congruency of their exchange rate assumptions during each time period. In the first 
period, the conservative investor's portfolio realises a higher return given the investor 
correctly anticipated a depreciation in the ZAR for the year ahead. However during the 
second period, the informed investor's portfolio outperforms as the exchange rate did in fact 
appreciate during the year. Both informed and conservative investors anticipated the ZAR 
would appreciate in the third period, but since the conservative investor's forecast was closer 
to the ZAR's realised appreciation during the period, his portfolio realises a larger return. 
Interestingly, the informed investor's portfolio yields a larger return relative to the 
conservative investor during the fourth period, despite having incorrectly predicted an 
appreciation in the ZAR. This is due to the PLA Y group realising the largest returns for the 
period even though the ZAR depreciated and could be attributable (as stated in section 2) to 
some PLAY stocks having a larger than expected leverage effect. Thus, given the informed 
investor forecasted an exchange rate appreciation, Markowitz portfolio analysis assigned a 
larger weight to the PLAYgroup in comparison to the conservative investor's optimal 
portfolio. The results illustrate that the relative success of the investment strategy presented is 












The depreciation of the ZAR has had an undeniable effect on the wealth of JSE investors 
through share price fluctuations. This research paper set out to determine whether Barr and 
Kantor's (2005) company classification could provide investors with a method to minimise 
the adverse effects of a volatile exchange rate when constructing portfolios. 
Barr and Kantor's (2005) sensitivity analysis of the 40 constituents of the ALSI40 to 
exchange rate movements was replicated and disparities were noted in the PLAYgroup. The 
results imply future studies may need to reclassify certain PLAY stocks to LEV stocks, as 
these South African companies expand their operations abroad. Notwithstanding, the 
sensitivity analysis provides further empirical research that supports the relationship between 
the ZAR exchange rate and the three stock classifications reported by Barr and Kantor 
(2005). 
The paper extends the work of Barr and Kantor (2005) by estimating the exchange rate and 
market beta coefficients of the HEDGE, LEV and PLAY groups for the period 2001:07 to 
2005 :06. The robustness of the beta coefficients estimated over the period, where the ZAR 
both depreciates and appreciates, further supports and provides empirical evidence of Barr 
and Kantor's (2005) stock classification. These beta estimates are used to calculate the 
expected returns of the three groups for the different investors considered that are dependent 
on the investor's assumptions regarding future exchange rate movements vis-it-vis PPP, as 
well as the market's realised return. Markowitz portfolio analysis is subsequently applied to 
obtain weights for the three groups of stocks, which are the constituents of the final portfolios 
constructed. The results are back-tested to determine whether the portfolios' realised returns 
can outperform the market, and thereby establish a successful investment strategy. 
Given the study assumes perfect foresight as to the market's future movements, further 
studies could determine whether the use of a market proxy, such as an appropriate risk free 
rate plus a market premium, would afford similar results. Notwithstanding, the results 
provide empirical evidence which imply a South African investor constructing portfolios 
based on PPP forecasted exchange rates and Barr and Kantor's (2005) stock classification 











informed investor is able to achieve consistently higher returns than the market, which 
suggests the relative success with which the investor can protect his investment and 
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~1 t(~l) ~2 t(~Z) Rz (ZARIUSD Beta) (ALSI 40 Beta) 
RAND HEDGE 
Liberty International 0.64 6.46 0.34 4.85 0.42 
SABMiller 0.45 3.80 0.53 6.49 0.38 
Richemont 0.27 1.78 1.07 9.89 0.49 
Old Mutual -0.22 -1.61 1.00 10.47 0.46 
RAND LEVERAGE 
Iscar 0.64 2.30 0.94 4.79 0.23 
Impala 0.49 2.56 1.16 8.59 0.45 
Sasol 0.43 2.48 0.61 4.98 0.25 
BHP Billiton 0.32 2.69 1.19 14.12 0.66 
Harmony 0.24 0.75 0.77 3.42 0.11 
Steinhoff 0.22 1.41 0.57 5.23 0.23 
Anglo Platinum 0.17 0.88 1.12 9.01 0.43 
Anglo American 0.12 1.07 1.54 19.80 0.78 
Sappi 0.06 0.35 1.16 10.19 0.47 
Anglo Gold 0.05 0.20 0.68 4.14 0.13 
Kumba 0.03 0.12 1.30 5.30 0.31 
Avgold 0.02 0.09 0.57 3.83 0.11 
Remgro 0.00 0.04 0.40 5.14 0.18 
Gold Fields -0.04 -0.14 0.77 3.85 0.11 
RAND PLAY 
Tclkom -0.78 0.64 -1.74 1.73 0.15 
Firstrand -0.67 -5.19 0.72 7.87 0.34 
Naspers -0.65 -2.58 1.13 6J8 0.24 
RMB -0.63 -4.63 0.70 7.26 0.30 
Imperial -0.60 -4.50 0.57 6.09 0.25 
Sanlam -0.55 -3.71 0.76 7.30 0.29 
MTN -0.55 -2.66 0.82 5.65 0.20 
Standard Bank -0.53 -4.01 0.65 6.99 0.28 
Nedcor -0.50 -3.38 0.54 5.22 0.18 
Pick 'n Pay -0.50 -3.34 0.40 3.83 0.13 
Liberty Group -0.45 -3.30 0.67 7.09 0.28 
ABSA -0.44 -2.48 0.65 5.26 0.18 
Bidvest -0.42 -3.38 0.49 5.58 0.20 
Barloworld -0.40 -2.98 0.83 8.88 0.37 
Woolworths -0.40 -2.42 0.51 4.43 0.13 
Investec Pic -0.35 -0.15 0.86 0.46 0.01 
Nampak -0.32 -2.30 0.54 5.50 0.19 
Investec Ltd -0.26 -1.39 0.80 6.21 0.23 
Amalgmated Beverages -0.25 -1.97 0.31 3.51 0.09 
Network Healthcare -0.21 -1.37 0.46 4.28 0.12 
Tiger Brands -0.20 OJI -1.71 3.75 0.10 












P, t(P,) P2 t(P2) R2 
(ZARIUSD Beta) (ALSI 40 Beta) 
RAND HEDGE 
Liberty International 0.56 3.78 0.17 1.34 0.39 
SABMilier 0.44 1.86 0.39 1.98 0.23 
Richemont 0.52 1.94 0.80 3.55 0.40 
Old Mutual 0.28 1.07 0.53 2.39 0.21 
RAND LEVERAGE 
Iscor 1.78 2.44 0.84 1.35 0.24 
Impala 0.79 2.18 0.65 2.09 0.27 
Sasol 0.58 2.24 0.22 1.0 I 0.19 
BliP Billiton 1.00 6.04 0.21 1.51 0.60 
Harmony 0.99 2.10 0.06 0.16 0.14 
Steinhoff 0.39 1.51 0.15 0.71 0.10 
Anglo Platinum 0.64 1.68 0.4 I 1.26 0.15 
Anglo American 0.84 2.92 0.22 0.91 0.27 
Sappi 0.80 2.77 0.21 0.87 0.25 
Anglo Gold 0.19 0.59 0.35 1.31 0.08 
Kumba 0.61 1.34 0.49 1.02 0.13 
Avgold 
Remgro 0.26 1.27 -0.02 -0.09 0.05 
Gold Fields 0.90 2.02 0.33 0.88 0.16 
RAND PLAY 
Telkom -1.63 -1.55 -1.74 -1.41 0.71 
Firstrand -0.11 -0.36 0.25 1.02 0.04 
Naspers -0.27 -0.54 0.33 0.78 0.03 
RMB -0.07 -0.25 0.19 0.78 0.02 
Imperial -0.20 -1.05 0.14 0.84 0.05 
Sanlam 0.29 1.10 0.09 0.39 0.05 
MTN -0.50 -1.42 1.00 3.32 0.30 
Standard Bank 0.03 0.11 0.27 1.31 0.06 
Nedcor -0.18 -0.78 0.39 1.99 0.13 
Pick 'n Pay -0.25 -0.98 0.06 0.25 0.03 
Liberty Group 0.19 0.94 0.20 1.20 0.09 
ABSA -0.03 -0.08 0.16 0.56 0.01 
Bidvcst -0.16 -0.76 0.16 0.88 0.04 
Barloworld 0.18 0.83 0.08 0.43 0.03 
Woolworths 0.00 0.00 0.29 1.52 0.08 
Invcstec Pic 0.44 0.96 0.67 1.47 0.24 
Nampak 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.00 
Investec Ltd 0.01 0.04 0.55 2.10 0.14 
Amalgmated Beverages -0.18 -0.77 -0.05 -0.27 0.03 
Network Healthcare 0.17 0.68 0.34 1.60 0.11 
Tiger Brands -0.05 -0.25 0.12 0.67 0.02 
Venfin 0.11 0.69 0.20 1.43 0.09 
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